bepress university libraries

DigitalCommons@bepress
NIU Test
7-15-1989

Enforceability of Guarantees by Charitable Organizations
Carl H. Wartman

Follow this and additional works at: https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test

Recommended Citation
Wartman, Carl H., "Enforceability of Guarantees by Charitable Organizations" (1989). NIU Test. 1640.
https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test/1640

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@bepress. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NIU Test by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@bepress.

Enforceability of Guarantees by
Charitable Organizations
CARL H. WARTMAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Charitable organizations, like for-profit corporations, are often
parts of an affiliated group of related entities. Also like for-profit
entities, these groups of not-for-profit entities may from time to time
wish to combine their collective credit to obtain financing on more
favorable terms than would be available to them separately. One
technique used to create these interdependent arrangements is a guarantee of the related corporation's obligations.'
A.

FOR-PROFIT GUARANTEES

The question of the enforceability of guarantees among affiliated
corporations has generated a substantial body of commentary and
case law. 2 With this background, certain generalizations have been
*
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I. The guarantee is often accompanied by a pledge of all or part of the
affiliated entity's assets given to support the guarantee.
2. Several of the more recent articles and comments are: Schwarz, The Impact
of Fraudulent Conveyance Laws on Future Advances Supported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 CARDOzO L. REv. 729 (1987); Walls, Promises to
Keep: Inter-corporateGuaranteesand FraudulentTransfers in Bankruptcy, 19 U.C.C.
L.J. 219 (1987) [hereinafter Walls]; Comment, Avoidability of IntercorporateGuarantees Under Sections 548(a)(2) and 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 N.C.L. REv.
1099 (1986); Ragusin, Brother-SisterCorporate Guaranties:Increased Legal Acknowledgment of Business World Realities, 11 J. CoRP. L. 391 (1986) [hereinafter Ragusin];
Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a
Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. REs. 433 (1980); Rosenberg, Inter-corporate
Guarantees and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 235 (1976) [hereinafter Rosenberg].
Cases in the area are perhaps more difficult to uncover than law review articles.
See, e.g., Cosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1983);
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981); Mfrs. and
Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In Re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp.), 578 F.2d 904 (2d
Cir. 1978).
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established with respect to guarantees by for-profit corporations which
are relied upon by lenders and their counsel in structuring and
documenting loans to affiliated entities. For example, a lender to a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent corporation which guarantees
the debt (a "downstream guarantee") can with some certainty conclude that the guarantee will be enforceable. This conclusion is based
upon an analysis of the benefits derived by the parent from the
guarantee. The reasoning holds that because the stock of the subsidiary is an asset of the parent, the parent is benefited on a dollar-fordollar basis by the increase in the subsidiary's assets resulting from
the loan. Thus, the guarantor has received "reasonably equivalent
value" or "fair consideration" as those terms are used in a creditors'
rights context and the guarantee is therefore enforceable. On the other
hand, a guarantee of a parent's obligations by its subsidiary (an
"upstream guarantee") may well be unenforceable. In the pure upstream context, the subsidiary has no ownership interest in the parent
and thus is not directly benefited by the loan to the parent. Without
direct consideration, the guarantee may fail in the event of the
subsidiary's bankruptcy or insolvency. Several commentators have
argued for broader interpretations of the benefit analysis to include
more remote benefits, and this approach has been adopted in several
cases.3
B. NOT-FOR-PROFIT GUARANTEES

Guarantees by charitable organizations' present different problems. The ownership link between the entities is absent due to the
nature of not-for-profit corporations, which typically do not issue
stock and are not "owned" in the conventional sense. At the same
time, it is more difficult to evaluate other benefits to the entity giving
3. See Walls, supra note 2, at 243-44; See also Ragusin, supra note 2, and
cases cited therein. Cases which take a more expansive approach to the benefit
analysis include Rubin, 661 F.2d 979; Ollag, 578 F.2d 904; In re Hemphill, 18 Bankr.
38 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1982); Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.
N.J. 1974).
4. This article does not attempt to distinguish the effect of the matters
discussed upon organizations created for charitable purposes, such as a foundation
organized for the purpose of obtaining contributions and making gifts to certain
specified donees, and organizations created for educational, social, or other nonbusiness purposes. The shared aspect of these institutions is their not-for-profit status,
and it is that status which creates the issues discussed in the article. However, the
nature of the organization's purpose and the means by which that purpose can be
fulfilled are relevant to an analysis of the organization's ability to make guarantees.
See infra text accompanying notes 28-46.

1989:4991

GUARANTEES BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

the guarantee, such as furtherance of a charity's overall mission,
which may exist only in a charitable context. Further, in deciding
whether to guarantee the obligations of another entity the charity's
trustees or directors and their advisors must consider related problems

created by laws governing not-for-profit corporations. These include
the risk of authorizing actions which might be found to be a waste
of the organization's assets, as well as the possibility that their action
could ultimately result in frustrating the charity's purpose.
This article briefly reviews the issues concerning enforceability of
inter-corporate guarantees and discusses the application of these concepts to charitable organizations. It then discusses related problems
raised by decisions involving analysis of the not-for-profit's charitable
purpose and suggests several approaches for reducing the risks presented by these problems. Finally, the article suggests appropriate

language for. legal opinions given in this context.
II.

STATUS OF ENFORCEABILITY ISSUES

Since the enactment of statutes limiting the ultra vires defense,
the issue of enforceability of inter-corporate guarantees almost invariably arises in an insolvency context. There are two principal bases
used by the person seeking to avoid enforcement of a guarantee: the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,5 which has been enacted in
most states, and Section 548(a) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 6
Section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act states that:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a
person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the
conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a
fair consideration. 7
Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code parallels the concept,
using different language:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor,
that was made or incurred on or within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily -

...

(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such a transfer or obligation; and
5. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985).

6. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1987).

7. UNITF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT

§ 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985).
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(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made
or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a
result of such transfer or obligation ....I
The issue under both statutes is whether the guarantee - an "obligation
incurred" for the benefit of a third party - is enforceable vis-a-vis the
guarantor's direct creditors.
Decisions under these statutes focus on the benefits which the
guarantor receives in return for its guarantee. While the matter is not
entirely free from doubt, it appears increasingly that the benefit which
inures to the parent in return for its guarantee of a wholly or majority
owned subsidiary will be sufficient to support the enforceability of
the guarantee in an insolvency situation. 9 Upstream guarantees or
''cross-stream" guarantees given on behalf of sister corporations
(subsidiaries with a mutual parent) remain subject to considerable
doubt as to enforceability because the benefits to these entities are
more indirect and less easy to evaluate. However, the types of benefits
which may be considered by a court and the weight which may be
given to these benefits have broadened significantly in recent years.
In Rubin v. ManufacturersHanover Trust, 0 the Second Circuit
stated that:
[w]e note that the trustees take too narrow a view of the fair
consideration requirement of § 67(d). .

.

. [T]he fact that a

third party initially receives the consideration given for the
debtor's property or obligation does not automatically mean
that fair consideration was lacking."
The Rubin court went on to reverse the district court's finding that
the guarantee in question should fail for want of consideration, 2
noting that the district court had failed to "attempt to quantify the
indirect benefits to either issuer or to compare those benefits with the
obligations assumed by the issuers under the guarantees."' 3
Although the Rubin decision did not result in immediate enforcement of the guarantees at issue in the case, Rubin has come to stand
for the proposition that a variety of direct and indirect benefits should
8. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1987).

9. See, e.g., In re W.T. Grant, 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983); Rosenberg, supra
note 2, at 238; Comment, Guaranteesand Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,
52 U. Cm. L. REv. 194 (1985).
10. 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
11. Rubin v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1981).
12. Id. at 993.
13. Id.
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be considered in evaluating the adequacy and fairness of the consideration given or received for a guarantee, and this proposition has
been followed in several later cases. 14 Commentators in the area have
also endorsed Rubin and have argued for a broader consideration of
the benefits derived by the guarantor."
These cases and commentaries suggest a number of potential
"benefits" to the guarantor which may be used to determine reasonably equivalent value, including:
(1) benefits to entities which are interdependent with the
guarantor;16
(2) rights of the guarantor to contribution and subrogation
from the related entity; 7

(3) business enhancement where the related entity is a customer

of the guarantor or otherwise produces business for the guarantor; 18 and

(4) funneling of all or part of the loaned funds to the guarantor. 19

Even with the introduction of the expanded list of acceptable
benefits, however, lenders still cannot predict with any certainty that
an upstream or cross-stream guarantee will be enforced, and no lender

is likely to rely on the enforceability of such a guarantee in making a

credit decision.
III.

APPLICABILITY TO CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS

In recent years, many not-for-profit entities have become large

businesses conducting operations in several fields. For example, a
charitable corporation originally established for the purpose of operating a single hospital may have grown, through contributions and

14. See, e.g., In re Grant, 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Join-In International (U.S.A.) Ltd., 56 Bankr. 555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Chase & Sanborn
Corp., 51 Bankr. 739 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
15. See, e.g., Walls, supra note 2, at 229; Ragusin, supra note 2, at 395-97.
16. Rubin v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981); In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Company, Ltd., 87 Bankr. 242 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
17. In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978) (circuit court
remanded to lower court for consideration of the value of contingent contribution
and subrogation rights for purposes of determining the guarantor's solvency).
18. In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1988) (guarantor
used its larger affiliate's distribution system to distribute its own products).
19. Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960) (guarantee of loan to stockholder upheld where stockholder contributed loan proceeds to guarantor).
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endowments, retained earnings and acquisitions, into a multiple entity
hospital system, operating hospitals, nursing homes, alcohol rehabilitation and diagnostic imaging centers, and other similar activities
through a number of separate not-for-profit corporations.
In this quasi-commercial context, guarantees serve a number of
useful functions. Guarantees are often used to support conventional
direct borrowing by an operating entity which has a fund-raising
affiliate with substantial resources. Multi-entity charitable organizations, particularly those engaged in operation of hospitals, frequently
use guarantees to back hospital bond offerings. In the hospital bond
area, all members of an "obligated group" become obliged to contribute to the payment of bonds issued under a master indenture,
whether or not any of the bond proceeds ever reach the member.20 In
other circumstances, an affiliate's guarantee may be used to restore
the credit of an organization experiencing financial difficulties. The
relationship among the affiliates is often very close, as, for example,
when the debtor/operating entity is the sole member of the fundraising organization providing the guarantee. However, the-connection
may also be relatively remote if, for example, the borrower's principal
function is the operation of church-sponsored nursing homes while
the guarantor holds income-producing real property investments for
the same church. The only connection in the latter situation may be
a governing body with ultimate control over both entities.
By definition, not-for-profit entities do not amass profits for the
benefit of an owner such as a shareholder. A not-for-profit institution
in Illinois, for example, may have members with voting rights in the
election of directors or may be organized with a self-perpetuating
board of directors, but the statute specifically prohibits the issuance
of shares and the distribution of dividends or other assets to members,
directors, or officers.2 '
In this context, the economic benefit arguments which are available in the for-profit area lose much of their strength, even in a
downstream situation. In a downstream situation, the "parent" entity
is the sole member of the "subsidiary," or, if the subsidiary has no
members, the parent may have control of the subsidiary's board of
directors. Because the not-for-profit statute does not allow the subsid20. See, e.g., Official Statement dated November 24, 1987, Illinois Health
Facilities Authority Adjustable Demand Revenue Bonds, Series 1987B (Ravenswood
Medical Center Project). Disclosure documents for bonds secured by the assets of an
"obligated group" typically describe fraudulent conveyance issues in the context of
risk factors.
21. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 106.05 (1987).
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iary to pay dividends to its parent,2 2 the benefit to the parent of a
loan to the subsidiary is significantly reduced. 23 The parent also does
not reflect the increase in the subsidiary's assets on its own balance
sheet, although the parent's own assets have been put at risk by the
guarantee.
While the ownership benefit analysis is either unavailable or is at
least highly questionable in the charitable context, many of the
alternative benefits described above may be present, particularly where
the related entities are engaged in similar or interlocking businesses,
such as operation of a hospital and an adjacent nursing home facility.
Where this is the case, the same benefit analysis can be applied in the
charitable context as in for-profit situations. However, as noted above,
few lenders will rely on the enforceability of guarantees based solely
on these forms of consideration and, where the relationship between
the entities is remote, it may be difficult or impossible to identify any
measurable economic benefit to the guarantor.
Despite the difficulties presented in identifying conventional benefits received by the guarantor in a charitable context, one concept
peculiar to not-for-profit organizations may provide an alternative
form of consideration sufficient to support the transfer. Under this
concept, the party seeking to enforce the guarantee may argue that
the charity's guarantee was given in the course of fulfilling the
guarantor's charitable purpose. This is essentially an attempt to
substitute the non-economic "value" of fulfilling the charity's purpose
for reasonably equivalent economic. value.
At least one court has accepted the charitable purpose argument
in the court's consideration of gifts to affiliates made by the charity
during its insolvency. In In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of
America (Wilson v. Upreach Ministries)'24 Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc. (MBFA), a non-profit corporation, made
monthly cash contributions to a variety of charities, including Upreach
Ministries, Inc. MBFA was concededly insolvent at the time of some
of the gifts. The trustee in bankruptcy sought to recover the gifts to
22. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 109.10 (1987). The statute does
permit payments "in furtherance of any of the purposes of the organization," which
leaves a route open for some distributions, provided the charter is properly drafted.
Id.

23. However, note the "obligated group" concept mentioned in the text
accompanying note 20, above, which attempts to avoid this problem by requiring
certain charter provisions for each guarantor which are intended to tie the group
together.
24. 24 Bankr. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
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Upreach, arguing that the transfers were fraudulent under § 548(a)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code. The court conceded that "[n]o one can
argue that MBFA received a monetary equivalent for the payments"
to Upreach. 25 However, the court noted that the primary purpose for
which MBFA was organized was to make charitable contributions to
religious organizations. The court concluded that:
§ 548(a)(2)(A) does not appear to require that 'reasonably
equivalent value' be a monetary equivalent. Land Wall and
the Board of Trustees of MBFA reasonably believed that they
were complying with the corporate purposes of MBFA in
making the contributions to Upreach Ministries. Additionally,
they surrounded themselves in the twenty-six homes which
MBFA operated with like-minded persons with religious interests. The morale of the employees and the good will of all of
those people with whom MBFA dealt was reasonably enhanced
by the continuation of the charitable contributions. Whether
it is called 'good will' or whether some other term is applied
the compliance with the mandate from the incorporators in
making the charitable contributions each month, notwithstanding its insolvency during a portion of the period, establishes
that a reasonably equivalent value was received by MBFA in
26
exchange for the challenged transfers.
Wilson's emphasis on the fulfillment of charitable purpose supports the use of this argument in the guarantee/benefit analysis, but
its value as precedent in a guarantee situation is doubtful. First,
Wilson involved a charity whose corporate purpose was "to provide
income for religious missions of the Baptist Church. ' 27 A guarantee
by MBFA, while it might have assisted the church's mission, would
not have directly fulfilled this purpose. In contrast, the contributions
in question were a direct source of income to Upreach. In a less clear
purpose situation, another court might be unable to reach the same
conclusion reached in Wilson, even if gifts are in question.
Wilson also presented a situation where relatively small cash gifts
had been made in a context in which creditors of MBFA could
reasonably expect such gifts to be made. Further, MBFA's contributions alone did not render that entity insolvent. Both of these factors
could well be absent in a guarantee situation. The guarantor's general
25. In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc. (Wilson v. Upreach
Ministries), 24 Bankr. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 974.
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creditors cannot reasonably expect that obligations may be undertaken
without economic benefit which, if called upon, would bankrupt the
guarantor. This is particularly true if the guarantor operates in a
mainstream commercial context, such as delivery of hospital services,
and is only loosely affiliated with the entity for whose benefit the
guarantee is given. For example, a bank creditor of a not-for-profit
entity which owns income-producing real property may reasonably
expect that the income from the property will be used to service the
entity's direct indebtedness rather than applied to fulfillment of the
entity's obligations under a guarantee of the debts of a health care
facility operated under the auspices of the same religious organization.
IV.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The charitable purpose concept is important not only from a
consideration standpoint but also in the more basic analysis of the
charity's corporate power to make the guarantee. While modern notfor-profit corporation statutes generally limit the ultra vires defense,
the concepts involved in the ultra vires cases are still relevant to an
examination of charitable guarantees, because not-for-profit corporations' purposes are frequently interpreted as being much more
narrow than those of for-profit corporations. 2 A number of cases
have examined whether various transactions, such as gifts, bargain
sales, or other transfers of assets for less than fair market value are
outside the charity's stated corporate purposes and therefore should
be prevented or unwound. 29 These cases are analogous to the guarantee
area and their analysis of charitable powers is instructive.
For example, in Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger,3 ° Queen
of Angels Hospital (Hospital), a charitable corporation organized for
the purpose of operating a hospital, entered into agreements which
provided for the lease of its sole hospital building to a third party.
The Hospital intended to use the lease revenues to establish and
28. Illinois, for example, lists twenty-nine purposes for which a not-for-profit
corporation can be organized under the not-for-profit statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
32, para. 103.05 (1987). The requirement of a specific purpose is in contrast to the
Illinois general corporation statute, which allows a for-profit corporation to state its
purpose as "the transaction of any or all lawful businesses for which corporations
may be incorporated under this Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 2.10(a)(2) (1987).
29. Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr.
36 (1977); Trustees of Rush Medical College v. Univ. of Chicago, 312 I11.109, 143
N.E. 434 (1924); Holden Hosp. Corp. v. Southern I11.Hosp. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 150,
174 N.E.2d 793 (1961).
30. 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
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operate freestanding outpatient medical clinics in the Los Angeles
area. The California Attorney General attacked the proposed transaction, contending that the Hospital "held its assets in trust primarily
for the purpose of operating a hospital"'" and that operation of clinics
would constitute an abandonment of the Hospital's primary purpose
32
and a diversion of charitable trust assets.
The California Court of Appeal agreed, noting that although the
Hospital's articles of incorporation allowed other activities, its primary purpose was to run a hospital, and it had represented to the
public, local and federal tax authorities, and donors that it was in the
business of operating a hospital.3 3 The court concluded that "In brief,
whatever else Queen of Angels Hospital Corporation may do under
its articles of incorporation, it was intended to and did operate a
hospital and cannot, consistent with the trust imposed upon it,
'3 4
abandon the operation of the hospital business in favor of clinics."
One wonders whether, in light of this reasoning, the Hospital
would even have the power to amend its articles to change its primary
purpose. Obviously, the California not-for-profit statute has procedures which would allow an amendment, but reliance on an argument
that the corporation's assets are impressed with a charitable trust
seems to exclude an amendment which would allow diversion of assets
from their application to the charity's primary purpose in effect at
the time the assets were received."
The result in Queen of Angels Hospital should be balanced by
cases in other jurisdictions which take a more liberal view of a
charity's permissible activities. Several Illinois cases, for example,
have refused to unravel or enjoin transactions which were arguably
37
outside the charity's purpose.3 6 For example, in Bertram v. Berger,
31. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 365, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 36, 39 (1977).
32. Id.

33. Id. at 368, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 41.

34. Id.

35. One might also question whether any amendment would have to occur at
the end of the hospital's tax year, given the court's reliance on the hospital's
representations to various taxing authorities with respect to the nature of the hospital's
business. Id.
36. Holden Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 150, 174
N.E.2d 793 (1961); Trustees of Rush Medical College v. Univ. of Chicago, 312 Ill.
109, 143 N.E. 434 (1924); Northwestern Univ. v. Wesley Memorial Hosp., 290 Ill.
205, 125 N.E. 13 (1919); Bertram v. Berger, 1 111. App. 3d 743, 274 N.E.2d 667
(1971).
37. 1 111. App. 3d 743, 274 N.E.2d 667 (1971).
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the Illinois Appellate Court allowed a charity the purpose of which
was the operation of a "churchly home for the aged" to transfer real
property and make an outright gift to another charity which intended
to operate a nursing home for the care of "aged and chronically ill
persons. "38 In addition, at least one Illinois case leans toward an
opposite view to that expressed in Queen of Angels Hospital. In
a9
Independent Order of Svithiod v. Ring Lodge No. 8, an Illinois
court upheld an allegedly ultra vires loan by a parent organization to
one of its subsidiary groups, distinguishing two earlier cases dealing
with for-profit corporations:
We do not regard either one of these cases as controlling here.
The corporations in those cases and the objects for which they
were formed are entirely different in their nature from the
complainant organization. The purpose for which the Independent Order of Svithiod came into being was a social
purpose.... The distinction between a corporation organized
for pecuniary profit and one organized for social welfare is
fundamental, and it by no means follows that the rule (relating
to ultra vires) applied to a corporation organized for pecuniary
profit should be applied to a society such as [the Order].40
While affirming the principle that corporate powers should be
strictly construed in the business context, the court proceeded to adopt
a more liberal interpretation of corporate powers in the nonprofit
arena:
We think the nature of the complainant corporation and the
purposes for which it was organized were such that the power
to loan its money upon security must be necessarily implied
41

The Svithiod court's result can be distinguished from Queen of Angels
Hospital42 because it did not involve the frustration or abandonment
of the Order's charitable purpose. However, Svithiod and several
other Illinois cases are nonetheless representative of an expansive
approach to corporate powers in the charitable area.
38. Bertram v. Berger, 1 111. App. 3d 743, 745, 274 N.E.2d 667, 668 (1971).
App. 289 (1931).
39. 261 I11.
App. 289,
40. Independent Order of Svithiod v. Ring Lodge No. 8, 261 I11.
(1931).
304-05
41. Id. at 307.
42. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr.
36 (1977).
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Charitable purpose questions may also arise under statutory
restrictions on distributions. Directors of charities considering a guarantee must also consider its legality under the applicable not-forprofit statute. In Illinois, for example, the not-for-profit statute
forbids "distributions" except in certain limited circumstances . 3 Directors who vote for or assent to an unauthorized distribution are
jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount of the
distribution." However, "a payment or transfer of money, property
or other assets in furtherance of any of the purposes of the corporation" is not considered a "distribution. ' 4 1 Thus, it becomes essential
that the guarantee, and any transfer in satisfaction of the guarantee,
be within the not-for-profit corporation's purposes, both for the sake
of the lender who is relying on its ability to enforce the guarantee if
necessary and for the charity's own directors. 46
While the charitable purpose cases do not specifically deal with
consideration, they are analogous because whether a given action by
the charity furthers its purpose is, as noted in Wilson, 47 at least
arguably the same question as whether the guarantor's business will
be benefited by a guarantee.4 8 If a guarantee can be shown to directly
and substantially assist a not-for-profit guarantor in achieving its
goals, the guarantee is much more likely to be upheld, even in an
insolvency context.
V.

LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS

The issue of a guarantee's enforceability is important not only as
a basis for lending decisions but may also be a key question in
43. ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 109.10 (1987).
44. Id. para. 108.65(a)(1).
45. Id.para. 109.10(b).
46. Although a discussion of the personal liability of directors and trustees of
not-for-profit corporations is beyond the scope of this article, it is possible that the
protection of the "business judgment" rule may not be available for the trustees or
directors of a not-for-profit entity who attempt to bind their corporation by an ultra
vires act. Further, directors and trustees may be liable for negligence or mismanagement of the assets under their control. Finally, and of particular interest where the
guarantee is given as a result of a request or requirement of an organization with a
variety of interlocking directorships, directors and trustees of not-for-profit institutions face conflict of interest problems similar to those of for-profit entities. Problems
of directors and trustees of not-for-profit corporations are discussed in Pasley, NonProfit Corporations-Accountabilityof Directors and Officers, 21 Bus. LAW. 621
(1966).
47. In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc. (Wilson v. Upreach
Ministries), 24 Bankr. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
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determining the potential personal liability of directors and trustees
of not-for-profit corporations. The "business judgment" rule may
not be available for the trustees or directors of a not-for-profit entity
who attempt to bind their corporation by an ultra vires act, or they
may be liable for negligence or mismanagement of assets under their
control. 49 In addition, directors can be personally liable for breach of
50
trust or perversion of the purposes of the charity. Finally, directors
of charitable corporations face conflict of interest issues similar to
those of for-profit entities.51 This may be of particular concern where
a guarantee is requested or given in the context of an organization
with a variety of interlocking members and directors.
VI.

PRACTICAL APPROACHES

The results in the charitable purpose cases (whether arising in an
insolvency context or otherwise) are likely to remain mixed depending
on the jurisdiction and the particular circumstances involved. However, a partial solution to the problem is careful drafting of the
charity's original articles of incorporation.
The first step for a charity which will have a "parent" organization or which will be part of a multi-entity organizational structure
is to make the new charity's primary purpose the furtherance of the
parent's or the entire organization's charitable purposes. This does
not mean that the charity's purpose clause should parrot that of the
parent. Although it may be useful to include language from the
parent's charter, the primary, ultimate purpose of the new charity
should simply be to benefit the parent entity or the organization as a
whole. While additional specific purpose clauses, such as operation
of a nursing home or educational institution, should also be included,
they should be made specifically subordinate to the primary overall
purpose of furthering the interests of the parent or organization.
Finally, particularly where borrowings and guarantees are anticipated,
49. See generally Pasley, Non-Profit Corporations- Accountability of Directors and Officers, 21 Bus. LAW. 621 (1966).
50. See Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th
Cir. 1948); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses
and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
51. See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1008-12 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Compare
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 108.60 (1987) (statutory provision with respect to
conflicts of interests of directors of Illinois charitable organizations) with ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.60 (1987) (statutory provision with respect to the same matter
contained in Illinois Business Corporation Act).
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the purpose clauses should include language clearly authorizing the
charity to enter into such arrangements.
In addition to including appropriate charitable purpose clauses,
if permitted by applicable state law drafters should also add provisions
in the not-for-profit corporation's charter providing for the distribution of all of its remaining assets upon dissolution to the corporation's
parent entity, and giving the parent entity complete control over the
timing and manner of the dissolution and subsequent liquidation.5 2
These drafting strategies are designed to strengthen the argument
that the guarantee of another charity's indebtedness, even if it could
exhaust the guarantor's resources, is in furtherance of the charity's
ultimate charitable purpose and should be enforceable. They also
bolster the argument that the subsidiary's assets ultimately "belong"
to the parent, even if they cannot be transferred by way of dividend
during the subsidiary's existence. These techniques have elements of
bootstrapping, but they do respond to some of the specific concerns
which arise in the charitable guarantee area and should be helpful in
an insolvency context.
Lender's counsel in a not-for-profit situation should not ignore
conventional sources of consideration for the guarantee and should
also consider structuring the loan to avoid these issues to the extent
possible. The loan agreement or guarantee should recite in reasonable
detail the tangible business benefits which the guarantor expects to
receive as a result of its guarantee. In the case of a re-lending or
other transfer of a portion of the loan proceeds by the borrower/
beneficiary to the guarantor, lender's counsel may also specifically
limit the guarantor's liability to the dollar value of benefits actually
received by the guarantor. Finally, counsel may be able to build
insolvency triggers into the loan documentation which would enforce
the guarantor's liability only to the extent that the enforcement will
not result in the guarantor's insolvency.
VII.

OPINIONS OF COUNSEL

The question of the guarantee's ultimate enforceability is paramount to any creditor of a charitable institution. However, the related
question of legal opinions in the area is also of considerable interest
to counsel representing charities."
52. Of course, the lender may well be faced with a situation in which the
charitable purposes of the organizations involved have already been established and
there are no practical means (whether because of timing or negotiation problems) to
unify the purposes prior to completion of the transaction.
53. There are many fine articles which have been written on the issues which

1989:4991

GUARANTEES BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

Opinions rendered to creditors of charitable organizations with
respect to guarantees will typically discuss the following matters,
among others:
(1) due authorization;
(2) legality, validity, and binding effect;
(3) enforceability; and
(4) violation or conflict with the entity's charter documents or
by-laws.
Opinions to lenders with respect to these matters, whether in a forprofit or not-for-profit context, are typically qualified by stating that
the opinion is subject to the effect, if any, of insolvency, bankruptcy,
reorganization, moratorium and other similar laws for the relief of
debtors. While this language should certainly be included, it would
also be prudent and appropriate to add additional language addressing
specific concerns related to charities.
First, counsel should confirm that the guarantee, if enforced, will
in fact further the guarantor's charitable purpose. With that concluded, the opinion with respect to authorization and enforceability
can read as follows:
The Guarantee has been duly authorized, executed, and delivered by and on behalf of Guarantor; delivery and performance
of the-Guarantee are within the scope of the charitable purposes of Guarantor; and the Guarantee is the legal, valid, and
binding obligation of Guarantor enforceable in accordance
with its terms; provided that a court may not compel payment
by a charitable corporation pursuant to a guarantee of third
party obligations if such payments would render the guarantor
insolvent or would result in the cessation or discontinuance of
any material portion of the charitable services provided by the
guarantor.
If requested by lender's counsel (and assuming the statement is
accurate), it would also be appropriate to state that counsel is unaware
arise in drafting and negotiating opinion language, as well as the proper scope of
both the opinion and the due diligence necessary to support it. See, e.g., Babb,
Barnes, Gordon, & Kjellenberg, Legal Opinions to Third Parties in Corporate
Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW. 553 (1977); Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions
- An Attempt to Bring Some Order Out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW. 915 (1973);
Subcommittee on Opinion Writing of the Massachusetts Bar Association, Committee
on Corporate, Banking and Business Law, Omnibus Opinion for Use in Loan
Transactions, 60 MAss. L.Q. 193 (1975).
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of any case in his or her jurisdiction in which a court declined to
enforce a guarantee in a similar context.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that lenders, not-for-profit organizations,
and their respective counsel will continue to require and deliver
guarantees of the obligations of related entities. In many cases, these
guarantees will not be supported by traditional, accepted forms of
consideration because no ownership link between the guarantor and
the beneficiary exists and, often, because the guarantee is simply given
at the request or direction of the governing body of a religious
organization which controls a variety of not-for-profit enterprises.
Eventually these agreements will be tested in an insolvency situation,
and there is a substantial risk that a court will refuse to enforce such
a guarantee in the absence of tangible benefits to the guarantor,
particularly if there are third-party creditors of the guarantor who
could not be expected to have foreseen a non-commercial transfer of
the guarantor's assets. However, cautious drafting of organizational
materials and loan documents, as well as careful documentation of
any other sources of consideration to the guarantor, will assist in the
ultimate enforcement of these arrangements.

